In new developments that emerged last week in the public inquiry of the Grenfell Tower tragedy, Bruce Sounes, the architect tasked with overseeing the refurbishment of the 24-story West London apartment tower, revealed that he was unaware that the plastic-filled aluminum composite rain screen cladding used in the project was combustible. Furthermore, Sounes said that he had not fully familiarized himself with existing governmental regulations “demanding external walls must adequately resist the spread of fire,” as The Guardian reported. On June 14, 2017, a small fire sparked in a fourth-floor apartment rapidly engulfed the 43-year-old, council-owned housing block in North Kensington as flames climbed upwards along the tower’s recently refurbished exterior. The fire raged for nearly 60 hours, completely gutting the structure while claiming 72 lives total in the process. Dozens of others suffered injuries. Serious concerns about fire safety had been brought to the attention of the building’s operator, the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation, both prior to and after the refurbishment, which was completed in 2016. Among these issues: The absence of a central fire alarm system, a dearth of emergency lighting, the presence of long-expired fire extinguishers, and the fact that the aging tower had only one central staircase for all 120 units (127 units at the time of the fire). The first phase of an official public inquiry into the tragic fire kicked off in September 2017, and included key evidence from emergency responders, building residents, engineers, and fire safety experts. The second phase of the inquiry commenced in January 2020, with the first section focused on the 2015-2016 refurbishment. In his testimony, Sounes, an associate architect at London firm Studio E Architects, admitted ignorance to issues such as fire spread and the regulatory guidance surrounding building safety features meant to curb the spread of fire in tall structures. Sounes claimed that ensuring the refurbishment—including specific products used in the refurbishment—exceeded fire safety guidelines was not in his professional purview as lead project architect. He told inquiry counsel that “it was the responsibility of the council’s building control department to check on compliance and other expert consultants were expected to advise,” according to the Guardian. “We asked for advice,” the BBC quoted Sounes as telling the inquiry, “but it wasn't for us to... satisfy ourselves because I don't think that was within our ability.” Sounes also confirmed in the inquiry that he had no previous experience working on high-rise projects or with the type of flammable polyethylene composite cladding material used in the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower. “I thought their melting temperature was quite high,” Sounes said of the insulating panels. “I was not aware they were combustible or a risk.” Speaking at the inquiry, Andrzej Kuszell, founding partner of Studio E Architects, said that his firm’s previous lack of experience working with high-rises should not be considered as a factor in the incident. “The issue of whether a project poses new challenges is not, I think—if that is the implication, that somehow we were not capable of doing the project, I think that is false,” Kuszell explained. “Because clearly every project, in your experience, there comes a point when every project is a first, and we had actually been dealing with projects of quite some sophistication and complexity as firsts.” Kuszell went on to apologize for the horrific incident while also blaming lax governmental fire regulations for allowing it to ever happen. “If we had understood that the building regulations were not robust, if we had understood that we can’t trust a certification, if we had understood that advice that was being given from parties who were either specialists or marketing products were that unreliable and misleading—this is so sad to say, but I don’t think this tragedy would have happened,” he said. “I’m really, really sorry for all of you,” he said while addressing the public gallery, which was populated with surviving former residents and family members of those who perished in the fire. “I can only say to you from my heart that we really wanted to do the absolute best project we could.” Declared as structurally sound, Grenfell Tower, site of the deadliest residential fire since World War II, continues to stand, cloaked in ghostly white sheeting. There are plans to demolish it and transform the site into a memorial, although any path forward is at least a couple of years off as the inquiry continues.
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An 856-page document of a government-led inquiry into London’s Grenfell Tower fire states that the materials used on the building, including those from a 2016 renovation by Studio E Architects, failed to meet regulations and accelerated the fire which killed 72 people in June 2017. The news follows a 2018 report by fire specialists BRE Global which claimed that the fire wouldn’t have spread so readily in the 43-year-old concrete tower block before it was renovated. The latest report released last Wednesday stated that the aluminum composite cladding added in 2016 was the “principal reason” for the blaze rapidly consuming the building, going on to say that it acted as a “source of fuel” and was further assisted by flammable insulation and materials around windows. In addition, Architect’s Journal reported that “the ‘decorative’ architectural crown of the tower also played a ‘significant role in enabling the fire to spread around the building.'” The cladding was made by the U.S. company Arconic and the fire is believed to have been sparked by a faulty Whirlpool refrigerator. The inquiry’s report also criticizes the “gravely inadequate” response by the fire brigade. However, Matt Wrack, the general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, disputed this characterization to the BBC: “The truth is that the fire spread the way it did because it was wrapped in flammable cladding," he said. "The firefighters turned up after that had happened, after the building had already been turned, in reality, into a death trap." Wrack went on to explain that while "nobody is trying to avoid scrutiny...we think that the ordering of the inquiry is completely back to front.” Following last week's report, lawyers suspect the chances of criminal charges being brought in relation to the fire have increased significantly, according to The Guardian. The second phase of the inquiry will investigate how the inadequate design and construction, which was in violation of existing regulations, was allowed to have happened. Former judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick who led the inquiry stated that he will also look into "what was and should have been known" about the particular dangers posed by thermoplastic polymers within the construction industry and those responsible for setting fire safety standards in the central government. Following this initial report, Moore-Bick has issued a series of proposals to shore up fire safety for towers in the U.K.
As of yesterday, $250 Million is available to private owners of tower blocks in the U.K. to replace cladding at risk of catching fire. The government fund is for towers that use the aluminum composite material (ACM) cladding—the same facade material employed by the Grenfell tower which caught fire in June 2017, claiming the lives of 72 people. Those who do not use the money will reportedly be "named and shamed" according to Robert Jenrick, Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (HCLG) in a statement released to the press. "Government funds are available for private building owners to remove and replace unsafe ACM cladding, and let me be clear, inaction will have consequences and I will name and shame those who do not act during the course of the autumn." "There is no excuse for further delay—and for building owners to fail to take action now would be frankly disgraceful." A national safety review of tower blocks was issued in the wake of the Grenfell fire in 2017. In May 2018, the government pledged $532 Million for state-owned blocks to remove any cladding deemed potentially dangerous. Private owners, meanwhile, were encouraged not to pass on the recladding costs to occupants. That, however, did not happen, and the most notable example occurred in Croydon, South London, where multimillionaire owner Vincent Tchenguiz refused to pay the $665,000 re-cladding fee. A tribunal following the debacle ruled that leaseholders should stump up the fee, leading to a deadlock between landlords and tenants. As a result, some had to start 24-hour patrols of their buildings to monitor for any fires while other homes have become unsellable. The government estimates that 170 privately-owned blocks currently use ACM cladding. In addition to the aforementioned funds, a further $5 million has been issued to collect data on cladding used for state-owned buildings. Motions to facilitate action to reduce fire risk due to ACM cladding have been slow in coming. Since the fire in 2017—24 months ago—there have been three different Secretaries of the HCLG, and four Ministers of State for Housing amid multiple cabinet shake-ups in the wake of Brexit. In his statement, incumbent Secretary of State Jenrick also unveiled a new Protection Board which has been set up by the Home Office with the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) to give assurance to those in tower blocks listed as high-risk that fire risks will be identified and acted upon. The board will have access to $12.5 Million each year until 2021. "The new Protection Board will make sure building owners don’t flout the rules, as well as ensuring fire safety risks in other buildings are being addressed," said Jenrick. In addition to investigating cladding, a commission has been set up to review when sprinklers are to be employed. Currently, sprinklers have to be used for buildings taller than 98 feet or roughly ten stories, but ministers are considering lowering this to 60 feet — roughly six stories. As reported by the Architects' Journal, this was a measure the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) called for, however, RIBA wanted all residential buildings above 60 feet to have sprinklers added to them. England lags behind its neighbors in this regard. In Wales, sprinklers are mandatory in all new residential buildings and in Scotland, the same applies to care homes, sheltered housing and schools above 60 feet. The current commission's review only covers housing blocks built since 2007. Grenfell Tower was completed in 1974 and did not have sprinklers added to it when it was refurbished in 2016 at the cost of $10.85 Million. According to the BBC, 96 percent of state-owned tower blocks above 98 feet (32 out of 837) do not have a sprinkler system installed.
C.F. Møller has designed a swath of social housing for an upcoming development called Blackwall Reach atop east London’s famous Robin Hood Gardens, a demolished series of brutalist blocks designed in the 1960s by renowned British architects, Alison and Peter Smithson. Initial plans released in 2017 indicated that the Danish firm would create a 330-unit complex featuring cross-laminated timber (CLT), a resourceful construction method that’s been gaining wide acceptance in the United Kingdom. But a recent government ban on combustible cladding materials has put plans for the engineered product in jeopardy, reported Architects' Journal. The new legislation, which was enacted late last December, was introduced after the Grenfell Tower fire of June 2017 in which one of West London’s tallest residential towers burned down, claiming 72 lives. After a pressure-filled campaign from Grenfell United, a group of survivors and victims’ families, the U.K.’s Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government introduced a new building safety code last summer that would prohibit the use of cladding materials holding a European fire rating of less than A1 or A2. Per the ruling, architects and developers cannot use such products in the external wall construction of schools, high-rise homes, hospitals, and care facilities, reported AJ. The ruling also calls for local municipalities to begin removing unsafe aluminum composite material (ACM) cladding on existing structures taller than 18 meters (about six stories). Though CLT is not an ACM and has been proven to perform well under fire load, it contains wood and is being cited as hazardous to lawmakers. CF Møller’s affordable housing design for Blackwall Reach is phase 3 of a larger, controversial regeneration plan of Robin Hood Gardens, which the London-based practice Metropolitan Workshop is overseeing. Phase 1b and Phase 2 includes the build-out of 268 homes across four buildings designed by Haworth Tompkins and Metropolitan Workshop. These structures, currently under construction, are slated for completion this year and in 2021. Phase 3 construction is expected to start following the move-in of residents to the new buildings. Overall, the 20-acre Blackwall Reach project is set to replace 250 high-rise homes within the area with a total of 1,575 new units. Swan Housing Association, a community development and management organization, is developing the site alongside the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and the Greater London Authority. While this is only one project suffering a design setback thanks to the new ban on combustible cladding materials, it signals what could become a major issue with the use of CLT products on future tall buildings in the U.K. and across Europe. Already a world leader in mass timber manufacturing and construction, it’s unclear how the U.K. will now move forward in creating large-scale projects using the material. The ban has recently received major criticism from industry leaders like the Timber Trade Federation and architects who worry about the environmental cost of restricting timber in large construction. The Royal British Institute of Architects came out in support of the ban in November but recommends it only apply to specific cladding applications.
After a fire ravaged the Grenfell tower block in Western London last June, killing 72 and leaving hundreds homeless, an in-depth investigation was launched into the cause of the fire and why it spread so rapidly. After fire specialists BRE Global pointed the finger at the combustible cladding used in the tower’s most recent renovation, England acted to implement a ban on combustible cladding in new structures—a ban that includes timber. The original Clifford Wearden and Associates–designed tower was built in 1974 with passive fire prevention in mind. However, a 2016 renovation (reportedly to beautify the housing block to improve the views from the wealthier neighborhoods to the south and east) clad the concrete building in combustible polyethylene-cored aluminum panels. Alleged incompetence on the part of the contractors also created a “chimney effect” wherein flames were able to travel upwards through the gap between the structure and flammable panels. These revelations led the UK’s Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government to declare a ban on combustible external cladding for new buildings over 59 feet tall and those that contain housing. Hospitals, dorms, schools, and residential towers would all be affected. The ban goes into effect on December 21, a full 17 months after the fire. The ban, which would also affect retrofits, effectively limits the materials that can be used as exterior cladding to steel, stone, glass, and others with a European fire rating of Class A1 or A2. After the final terms of the ban were revealed, the Architects’ Journal reported that London’s Waugh Thistleton Architects, of cross-laminated timber (CLT) proponents, spoke out against the restriction of timber in high rises. Other than slowing the research and development of engineered timber, the ban would disallow the use of a low-carbon cladding alternative. On the other hand, the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), has seemingly embraced the ban. Adrian Dobson, RIBA director of professional services, released the following statement shortly after the ban was first announced: “It is good news that the Government has acted on the RIBA’s recommendations to ban combustible cladding on high-rise residential buildings over 18m. The ban needs to be accompanied by clear guidance and effective enforcement to promote fire safety and leave no room for cutting corners. “However, toxic smoke inhalation from the burning cladding very likely contributed to the disproportionately high loss of life at the Grenfell Tower disaster. Permitting all products classified as A2 does not place any limits on toxic smoke production and flaming particles/droplets. In our view, this is not an adequate response to the tragic loss of life and might still put the public and the Fire and Rescue authorities at unnecessary risk.”
An investigation by fire specialists BRE Global into the Grenfell Tower disaster was leaked exclusively to the Evening Standard, and their findings singled out the building's recent renovation as a major cause of the fire’s disastrous impact. Compiled as a part of the police investigation into the June 2017 fire in London that killed 71, the 212-page report, dated January 31, 2018, claims that the poor quality of materials used and substandard installation practices during the 2014-2016 renovation turned the tower into a tragedy waiting to happen. Built in 1974, the original Clifford Wearden and Associates-designed concrete tower block had been designed to passively contain potential fires. But the BRE report claims that the refurbishment failed to meet fire safety standards, and that cost-cutting led to serious mistakes throughout. It further states that, pre-renovation, the building's original concrete facade would not have allowed the fire to spread beyond its fourth-floor starting point in Flat 16. BRE identified several damning pieces of evidence of serious incompetence in the renovation. Besides the well-publicized use of a combustible polyethylene (combustible plastic) core in the aluminum-clad facade, the report also identified alleged incompetence by the contractors. Cavity barriers, which should have expanded when exposed to heat and sealed off the gap between the new cladding and original facade, were either too small, installed upside down or back-to-back. Instead of sealing the gap off, they instead created a “chimney effect” and funneled flames higher up the structure. BRE also attributed the fire's rapid spread to the installation of window frames that were approximately six inches shorter than the span of the concrete columns they had been installed between, and the use of a rubber membrane, foam insulation, and lightweight plastic panels to fill the gap. None of these materials would have provided over 30 minutes of fire resistance. Instead of restraining the fire, these materials allegedly fueled it, and allowed the fire to re-enter the building from the facade cavity. Further compounding the issue is BRE’s finding that only 17 percent of apartments had automatic door closers that worked, which would have kept the fire from spreading to the building’s hallways and core. Other than the building’s total lack of sprinklers (a fact that caused an outcry in Britain when it was revealed), the BRE reports: “A building of Grenfell’s height ought to have been fitted with a wet rising main [which contains water at all times] as part of the refurbishment; instead the existing dry rising main [which has to be supplied from a fire engine] was extended and modified.” Because the surrounding landscaping only allowed a single fire engine at the base of the tower, firefighters were unable to create an adequate amount of water pressure to reach the building’s upper floors. While the investigation into the Grenfell fire is still ongoing, plans for the site’s remains have been moving full speed ahead. Once the forensic analysis of the building is complete at the end of this year, the tower will be razed and the site handed over to survivors of the fire, with plans to convert the site into a memorial.
An architectural research agency devoted to the innovative investigations of catastrophes and violence has just launched an inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire, a June 2017 blaze that engulfed a West London social housing complex and killed 71 people and injured 70 more. Forensic Architecture put out a call on Twitter today, asking witnesses to send in videos of the conflagration to kick off a "a long-term and open-ended" inquiry into the incident. Experts contend that the fire was hastened by the facade's cladding and highly flammable polystyrene insulation. Forensic Architecture, directed by architect Eyal Weizman, is a collaboration between architects, computer specialists, journalists, filmmakers, scientists, and others, is based at Goldsmiths, University of London. Far from a mere video content farm, the group uses its resources to illuminate the inner workings of conflict situations, often taking amateur footage as a basis for their analysis. Its findings are deployed in courts and human rights reports, among other fora. Forensic Architecture took to Twitter to encourage witnesses to send in their movies of the event:
Grenfell Tower, a 24-story Brutalist building in North Kensington, was designed by Clifford Wearden and Associates and completed in the 1970s. Forensic Architecture is compiling the videos, determining the orientation of the (usually) smartphone-wielding videographer, and projecting them onto a 3-D model of the building. Would-be contributors can submit their footage, anonymously or not, here. The news comes on the heels of an announcement that London's Adjaye Associates, along with five other firms, have been selected to share ideas for the future of Lancaster West Estate, the municipal housing complex that hosted Grenfell Tower. If an architect is selected and everything goes according to plan, work on the project is slated to begin in 2019.
Today we are launching a long-term and open-ended project on the #Grenfell Tower fire. Support the project, learn more, and share with us your video footage at https://t.co/WFzcUA5gRZ pic.twitter.com/av3uBZsYAZ— ForensicArchitecture (@ForensicArchi) March 21, 2018
The United Kingdom has announced that it will be turning over the future of the Grenfell Tower site in West London over to victims and families of those affected by the devastating fire in June of last year that ultimately claimed 72 lives. In a statement released this morning, the UK’s Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government outlined a set of principles for guiding decision-making at the site with those affected given majority control–it’s presumed that the site will be razed and become a memorial moving forwards. The agreement was jointly forged and signed by the government, the survivors, and the local Kensington and Chelsea council. While the burned-out remnants of the council-owned tower block are still standing, it’s expected that the gutted remains will be torn down at the end of 2018 following an in-depth forensic analysis. In a scathing interim report, Dame Judith Hackitt, part of a group evaluating the government’s failure in preventing the fire, placed the blame on cost cutting and the negligence of the regulatory system. It isn’t the first charge levied against the government for being complicit in the Grenfell disaster, and a debate on public housing has been roiling Britain since last summer. Public officials are hoping that handing over the fate of Grenfell Tower to the community will alleviate some of the blowback and have stressed that this agreement is meant to bring closure to the affected. The local Latimer Road Tube station may also be renamed to Grenfell at some point in the future. “Since day one of my leadership I have been clear,” said the leader of Kensington and Chelsea council, Elizabeth Campbell. “The council will listen every step of the way to the survivors, the bereaved, and the wider community and assist in any way it can to ensure that a lasting memorial is put in place.” The full text of the principles can be found here. It’s uncertain whether the move will assuage anger at the government over the Grenfell fire, as the investigation has seemingly stalled out in recent months. It may also do little to combat claims that the flammable cladding was installed to improve views of the tower from the wealthier communities nearby.
Since the June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire, the United Kingdom is attempting to come to terms with a ubiquitous feature of its urban landscape, the council-owned tower block. Built in 1974, the Grenfell Tower had recently-installed cladding meant to insulate the decades-old structure. Instead, the renovation served as an accelerant, leaping over the concrete floor plates that should effectively seal potential fires. The severity of the conflagration within a council-owned tower housing some of society’s most vulnerable raises the question of whether the British regulatory environment and construction industry facilitated such a tragedy. The Guardian reports that the ‘Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety,’ has lodged a searing indictment of Britain’s construction industry and governmental regulation of high-rises. Authored by Dame Judith Hackitt, the report describes the practices that led to the Grenfell Tower fire as being caused by a “mindset of doing things as cheaply as possible and passing on responsibility,” and the use of third-party inspections that are “open to abuse given the potential conflicts of interests, with growing levels of mutual dependence between developers and contracted inspectors.” In short, the regulatory organs tasked with insuring building safety are increasingly in collusion with the property interests they are meant to police. With more than a million people living in council-owned tower blocks, the review of British building practices and the regulation of high-density developments is imperative. As noted by The Guardian, Hackitt described the “whole system of regulation” as “not fit for purpose, leaving room for those who want to take shortcuts to do so.” Although Hackitt’s report does not provide a specific framework to address the safeguarding of the country’s council-owned tower blocks, she emphasizes the need for greater clarity within regulatory guidance documents, increased scrutiny of inspectors and developers, as well as an examination of sprinklers, escape routs, cladding and alarm systems.
In West London, a devastating tower block fire has claimed the lives of 17 people. The fire appears to have spread via recently-installed cladding to the block, known as Grenfell Tower, which was originally built in 1974. That cladding was applied last year to the tune of $11 million; it was installed to insulate the 40-year-old structure and to appease the view from nearby conservation areas and luxury flats. Planning documents from 2014 obtained by The Independent read: "Due to its height the tower is visible from the adjacent Avondale Conservation Area to the south and the Ladbroke Conservation Area to the east.... The changes to the existing tower will improve its appearance especially when viewed from the surrounding area." The documents also included: "The re-clad materials and new windows will represent a significant improvement to the environmental performance of the building and to its physical appearance." The cladding project was part of the Grenfell Tower Regeneration Project carried out by design consultant Rydon for the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO), who consulted the London firm, STUDIO E LLP, whose name appears on plans. The spandrel wall panel system used an ACM cassette rainscreen with an aluminum composite material covering polystyrene insulation. Polystyrene, according to the German flammability and combustibility rating system, is highly flammable or "Easily Ignited." Subsequently, it is banned from being used in any exposed installations in building construction if the material is not flame-retardant. When the facade work was finished, Rydon issued a statement saying the "rain screen cladding, replacement windows, and curtain wall facades have been fitted giving the building a fresher, modern look." "The issue is that, under building regulations, only the surface of the cladding has to be fire-proofed to 'class 0,' which is about surface spread," said Arnold Tarling, a chartered surveyor and a fire safety expert in The Guardian. "The stuff behind it doesn’t, and it’s this which has burned." Speaking to The Architect's Newspaper (AN), a London Fire Brigade Firefighter said that the structure's cladding "made it act like a chimney." The cavity behind the panels, he explained, allowed smoke to travel up the building and heat up the new facade before setting it on fire. "If the cladding hadn't been there then the fire definitely wouldn't have spread that quickly. Usually, in tower fires, the concrete levels act as a sealed lock to contain the fire, but this has not happened here." The Firefighter added that people who had their windows open during the hot weather could also have been a factor: this allowed the fire to reach more fuel such as furniture. Despite the reported number of deaths, he said he wouldn't be surprised if that rose to 100. Another London firefighter told AN that there are "a lot more [fatalities] than they have announced." Could this tragedy have been prevented? Many think so. There were repeatedly reported concerns to KCTMO, a private company in London's wealthiest borough. These concerns, made by residents, raised issues of fire safety yet were ignored. In numerous blog posts that explicitly warned of a fire "catastrophe," the council—instead of helping—replied by threatening legal action. Furthermore, 90 percent of residents signed a petition calling for an investigation into the organization that runs the building. However, the council turned it down. In addition to this, a fire action notice put up by KTCMO in the tower told residents to stay in their flat in the event of a fire. If that wasn't enough, a fire at another London tower block (at Lakanal House, in 2009) which resulted in six fatalities appears to have been ignored. Findings in the resulting analysis discovered that inadequate fire risk assessments and panels on the exterior walls did not provide the required fire resistance. The local council was, however, fined $727,263 for its negligence. After such a tragedy, one would expect fire safety standards for buildings to be updated. It appears that was not the case. Though amendments were made in 2007, 2010 and 2013, none addressed the specific issues raised by Lakanal House. In 2016, seven years after the fire, Housing Minister Gavin Barwell said that the government will review part B of the UK's Building Regulations, a section which covers fire safety. This year, Ronnie King, Honorary administrative secretary of the All-Party Parliamentary Group, said the building regulations "haven't taken account of the Lakanal House fire inquest, or updated recent accredited research." STUDIO E LLP's work for KCTMO was approved in 2012, before Barwell's announcement of a review into a fire which happened in 2009. The incompetence and apathy regarding building fire safety are shocking, but this tragedy is the result of deregulation in the housing sector and removal of red tape that supposedly allows developers more freedom to build. Instead, it leads to worse and less safe housing conditions. And amazingly, the story of willful ignorance of experts continues. A survey from 2015 by the Fire Sector Federation, which discusses fire and rescue organizations, found that 92 percent of members thought that regulations were “long overdue an overhaul,” stipulating that they do not cater to modern day design and construction methods. In 2013, then London Mayor Boris Johnson of The Conservative Party told a Labour opponent to "get stuffed" when he was questioned about cuts to the fire service. More recently, in March this year, experts warned that the (Conservative) government's delay in reviewing building regulations could be "endangering tower blocks throughout the UK." Roughly 4,000 British tower blocks are in danger because of the outdated regulations. “We are still wrapping postwar high-rise buildings in highly flammable materials and leaving them without sprinkler systems installed, then being surprised when they burn down," architect and fire expert Sam Webb told The Guardian. As a result of the fire, Grenfell Tower's displaced residents are now without a home, and that's a tough thing in Kensington and Chelsea where the average house price is $1,748,158. During the final stages of the housing bill in the Commons in early 2016, a Labour amendment to ensure landlords were required to keep homes in a liveable standard was voted down by 312 votes to 219, voted for by nearly the entire incumbent Conservative party. At that time, 39 percent of Tory MPs were landlords. To cater for the displaced and newly homeless residents, many are kindly offering their homes out for people to stay. Meanwhile, there are 1,399 empty homes in Kensington and Chelsea, more than anywhere else in the UK. The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, has ordered a full public inquiry into the event.
Two pretty cool things happened this month in the world of fire safety. Both products are suitable for commercial and residential use and require little effort when being added to existing spaces. The Plumis Automist Smartscan can be easily retrofitted in just a few hours, as it connects to the buildings existing water supply using flexible low-pressure hoses. The sprinkler uses a sensor to constantly monitor the room and detect a change in the rooms temperature. If a hot-spot is detected the sprinkler will pop-out and spray a fine mist directly at the targeted area which results in less damage while also saving water (about 90 percent). The system is not quite available for purchase, but has been undergoing extensive testing in both the U.S. and the U.K. The Tarkett Safe-T first system uses photoluminescent technology to clearly mark exit paths in event of fire or power outage. The systems is compliant with International Building Code and uses no electricity, in case back up systems are not available. The light comes from the use of non-toxic inorganic strontium aluminate crystals that absorb light source energy. The product is highly durable which makes it perfect for high-traffic areas.
A raging fire that consumed a luxury skyscraper in the United Arab Emirates on New Year’s Eve is raising concerns about the safety of a number of ultra-high towers that have come to define contemporary Dubai. Just a few hours before midnight last Thursday, fire erupted at the Address Downtown Hotel, a 63-story building near the Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building. The flames spread to cover approximately 40 floors in just minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lPCL3sNVBcM The New Year’s Eve fire is not the first to break out at one of the city’s super-tall towers. In February of 2015, a fire erupted at an 86-story structure, regrettably named the Torch, which was the tallest residential building in the world when it opened in 2011. In 2012, a large fire gutted the Tarmweel Tower, a 35-story residential building, rendering it uninhabitable. https://twitter.com/AtiehS/status/682617847139418112 In all three instances, the buildings’ cladding panels, which, according to the website Gulf Business, can contain a dangerous mix of aluminum and polyurethane, are likely the cause of the rapid rates at which the fires spread. The chemical combination is also highly combustible in dry, desert air. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0EXGvUCIdUc While such cladding is not necessarily hazardous, it can become extremely flammable under specific conditions, and depending on the building’s design. In an interview with The National, Samer Barakat, the chief executive of Alumco, which supplied the panels of the Address building, stated that two-thirds of the buildings in Dubai are covered with non-fire rated aluminum composite panels (ACP). “From our side we complied. We gave all our submissions, there was approval on every submission according to specification,” he told the UAE newspaper. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=7&v=mXNMaCBw-Lk By the time the United Arab Emirates changed its Fire and Life Safety Code to mandate fire-retardant cladding for all buildings taller than 50 feet in 2013, numerous tall buildings erected during Dubai’s construction boom had already used non-fire rated exterior cladding. The Address Hotel was completed in 2008. The recently enacted regulations do not apply to existing buildings, however. And while the cost of replacing cladding on skyscrapers built before 2013 with safer materials would be an extremely costly undertaking, the cost of not doing anything—which could include possible demolition and replacement due to severe damages—could be far worse.